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Real Property-HOMESTEAD-LIEN FOR RECREATION RENTAL ARISING
FROM NONPAYMENT WILL PREVAIL OVER BUYER'S HOMESTEAD
RIGHT-Bessemer v. Gersten, No. 52,264, 6 FLA. L.W. 78 (Sup. Ct.
Feb. 8, 1979).
On February 25, 1969, Robert and Dina Gersten executed a
"Contract for Purchase and Sale" with the Behring Corporation for
the construction and purchase of a home in The Mainland of Ta-
marac Lakes, a subdivision being developed by Behring.' The con-
tract specifically provided that the purchaser would pay a monthly
maintenance and recreational facility charge to the seller or his
assigns. In return, the seller agreed to convey title free of all en-
cumbrances "except easements, restrictions, reservations and mort-
gages, if any."2
Behring Corporation recorded a declaration of restrictions per-
taining to The Mainland on January 8, 1970. The document re-
stated the obligation of each unit owner to pay the monthly recrea-
tional fee and provided for a lien upon the lot for nonpayment of the
fee.' Furthermore, the declaration stated that its provisions "shall
be considered and construed as covenants, restrictions, reservations,
and servitudes running with the land."4
On April 9, 1970, Behring entered into a lease for recreational land
with July Investment Corporation as lessor. The lease restricted the
use of the premises to recreational purposes and gave the lessor the
right to enforce the liens which Behring might acquire through the
declaration of restrictions. Moreover, both the lessor and the Behr-
ing Corporation had the right to enforce the liens against the unit
owners' property and to apply any sums collected to the rent owed
by Behring under the lease.'
On November 27, 1970, the Gerstens took title to their home and
received a deed. The deed incorporated by reference the previously
recorded declaration of restrictions. In five years, the Gerstens' rec-
reational lease fee increased from $26 to $52.91 per month.' Robert
1. Gersten v. Bessemer, 352 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd, No. 52,264,
6 FLA. L.W. 78 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 1979).
2. 6 FLA. L.W. at 78. The pertinent provisions are: "Purchaser agrees to pay $26.00
(approx.) monthly maintenance and recreational facility charge to the Seller ... or assigns
... . The Seller will supply to the Purchaser a Release of Lien Certificate and Warranty
Deed, conveying title free and clear of all encumbrances, except easements, restrictions,
reservations, and mortgages, if any." Id.
3. Id. The Declaration provided that each lot owner would be obligated for payment of
1/476th of the total monthly rent of $4760, or $10 per month. The instrument declared the
developer's intention to enter into a long-term lease of the land and to pledge to the prospec-
tive lessor the right to receive payments from the lot owners as security for the rent.
4. Id. Behring was the sole owner of the property at this time.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Gersten organized his neighbors in protest of the fee increases and
foreclosure upon nonpayment.7 On December 11, 1975, the executor
and trustees of the Bessemer estate, successor in interest to the
Behring Corporation, brought a foreclosure suit against Gersten for
the nonpayment of recreational land rent. Judgment was entered
against the Gerstens despite their assertions of the homestead pro-
tections in article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. The court acknowl-
edged the obligation to pay but found that since the original con-
tract did not refer to a lien, a contractual lien could not have been
formed at that time. The court found that the lien was created
contractually when the purchasers accepted the deed at closing.'
This obligation was, however, unenforceable against homestead
property because when a lien attaches after or contemporaneously
with the establishment of homestead, priority is afforded to the
homestead right.'" Pursuant to this rationale, the court held that
foreclosure was prohibited by the homestead provisions of the Flor-
ida Constitution."
7. Clemings & Pelligrino, Decision Upholding Rec Leases to Affect Thousands in Condos,
Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel, Feb. 10, 1979, § B, at 6, col. 1.
8. 6 FLA. L.W. at 78. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 provides:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of
taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improve-
ment or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for the house, field or other labor
performed on the realty, the following property owned by the head of a family:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a muncipality, to the extent of one hundred
sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which shall not be re-
duced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent inclusion in a munici-
pality; or if located within a municipality to the extent of one-half acre of contig-
uous land, upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner
or his family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.
(b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner.
(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by
spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse
if there be no minor child. The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse
if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married,
may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse. If the
owner or spouse is incompetent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be
as provided by law.
9. 352 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd, No. 52,264, 6 FLA. L.W. 78 (Sup.
Ct. Feb. 8, 1979).
10. 352 So. 2d at 70. See generally Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1968).
11. 6 FLA. L.W. at 79. See generally Avila S. Condo. Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d
599 (Fla. 1977); Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins. Inc., 207 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1968).
For an excellent study of Florida's homestead laws, see Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chame-
leon, The Florida Homestead Exemption, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 12 (1948). See also Maines &
Maines, Our Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida's Homestead Exemption, 30 U. FLA. L. REV.
227 (1978).
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On review for rehearing, a per curiam denial by the appellate
court certified five questions to the supreme court. 2 The supreme
court framed the issue as:
[Whether a developer can impose upon lots in a subdivision
encumbrances creating affirmative duties to make cash payments
for recreational purposes, to be enforced against a buyer through
the mechanism of a foreclosable lien, and whether, where the only
act of the buyer showing intent to pledge the property as security
is the acceptance of a deed embodying the covenant and lien provi-
sions, the lien arising from nonpayment will prevail over the
buyer's homestead right, where homestead attached at the time of
the buyer's taking title by deed. 3
The court quashed the decision of the district court and found the
lien to be enforceable. However, a petition for rehearing has been
granted. 4
Two days after the supreme court issued its opinion, the interest
stemming from the decision was reflected in a local newspaper arti-
cle proclaiming, "Decision Upholding Rec Leases to Affect Thou-
sands in Condos."' 5 Simply stated, a "rec lease" requires a monthly
fee for the use and maintenance of the recreational property, which
could include club houses, swimming pools, tennis courts, etc. Rec-
reation leases are often challenged on various grounds. One recent
case attacked their validity and enforceability on the basis of Sher-
man antitrust violations, false representations, breach of contract,
self-dealing, and unconscionability.'5 What then is the pernicious
nature of this creature, the recreation lease?
Recreation leases are the "add-ons" in many developments. A
buyer cannot enter certain developments without such a lease.
These inescapable costs perhaps would not be so objectionable and
overbearing if it were not for the escalator clauses. They are com-
monly pegged to the consumer price index or some other barometric
variable."
12. 352 So. 2d at 71.
13. 6 FLA. L.W. at 78.
14. Petition for rehearing without argument granted May 4, 1979.
15. Clemings & Pelligrino, supra note 7.
16. Bennett v. Behring, 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979). The unconscionability chal-
lenge was based upon three grounds: (a) gross price disparity, i.e., excessive rents; (b) onerous
and oppressive elevator clause; (c) unconscionability of having the property subject to liens.
In a memorandum opinion, United States District Court Judge Jose A. Gonzalez, Jr., held
that the record did not support a finding of unconscionability. See also FLA. STAT. § 718.122
(1977) regarding unconscionable leases in condominium projects.
17. Monthly rental fees may, however, be fixed. The terms are usually contained in the
declaration of restrictions, executed and recorded by the developer.
1979]
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In its most elementary form, a lien is a charge on property for the
payment or discharge of a debt or duty,' a legal right which the law
creates in order to satisfy a debt from a particular res.11 A lien may
be created by contract between the parties or by operation of law. 0.
Florida has codified certain liens in chapter 713, Florida Statutes.'
In addition to contractual and statutory liens, an equitable lien may
also be created when an intent to pledge or charge property is
found.22 Liens on real property may be created contractually (mort-
gage agreement);23 equitably ("in the interest of right and jus-
tice");24 or statutorily (mechanics lien) .25
Bessemer concerns the narrow issue of when the lien attaches and
its enforceability against homestead property. Although the opinion
is somewhat unclear, the resolution is simple because of well-
developed case law in this area.
The Gerstens asserted a homestead defense against the lien be-
cause the purpose of the homestead exemptions is to protect the
debtor's family from being reduced to destitution, and thus prevent
the foreclosure of homestead property.26 Moreover, the homestead
exemption is liberally construed to protect the family home.27 The
right of the owner to have the family home exempt from certain
liability is superior to the claims of creditors in many cases. Yet
homestead property is subject to levy under judgments recorded
prior to the time such property becomes homestead.2 8 Therefore,
with regard to liens and homestead claims, the determination of
superior rights is a time-dependent issue.29
The "material time" which resolves whether a lien will be subor-
dinate to the homestead exemption is the time of "attachment. 3 0
If the lien attaches prior to the establishment of homestead status,
the lien prevails. If homestead is established prior to the attachment
of the lien, the exemption rights prevail. 31 Due to the liberal treat-
18. Phillips v. Atwell, 80 So. 180 (Fla. 1918).
19. Sanford v. McClelland, 163 So. 513, 514 (Fla. 1935).
20. Wills v. Andrews, 72 So. 174 (Fla. 1916); see 21 FLA. JUR. LIENS § 3 (1958).
21. (1977).
22. Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127 (Fla. 1925); Carter v. Suggs, 190 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
23. FLA. STAT. § 697.02 (1977).
24. Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127, 129 (Fla. 1925).
25. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.01-37 (1977).
26. See Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1954). See also Maines & Maines, supra
note 11.
27. Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins. Inc., 207 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1968).
28. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1969).
29. See Crosby & Miller, supra note 11, at 35.
30. Id. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Peel, 145 So. 177 (Fla. 1932).
31. See 40 AM. Jua. 2d Homestead § 94 (1968).
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ment afforded the homestead exemption, if the lien attaches simul-
taneously with the acquisition of homestead status, the exemption
prevails.32 Despite the fact that these established rules of priority
were unquestioned by the trial court, the district court of appeal,
and the supreme court in Bessemer, each forum differed as to the
date of attachment.3
Basically, a lien comes into existence on the date of attachment.34
Liens are generally satisfied in the order of their creation; "first in
time is first in right." The usual rule of priority between a statu-
tory lien and another lien is determined by the order in which they
are made of record.36 For example, a mortgage lien gives construc-
tive notice from the time of recording; 37 a statutory lien, from the
time labor or materials are furnished.3
In Bessemer, the supreme court determined that the recreational
lease was an affirmative covenant running with the land."9 In Vetzel
v. Brown, 10 the court earlier had held that the "unilateral" recording
of a declaration of restrictions was constructive notice of the re-
corded use restrictions so that a developer may institute a general
plan and be assured that his designs for the property will not be
frustrated. As in the present case, the grantees in Vetzel received a
deed from the grantor which contained a statement that title was
"subject to easements and restrictions of record."'" Likewise, the
Gerstens were made aware of the recreation charge in the contract
for purchase and sale by reference to the declaration of restrictions
in the deed itself. As in Vetzel, the deed restrictions involved in
Bessemer were recorded and a matter of public record prior to the
closing. So, the question remains for rehearing whether the enforce-
ment mechanism (the lien) attaches.
32. See Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1968).
33. 352 So. 2d at 68; 6 FLA. L.W. at 78.
34. See Heddon v. Jones, 154 So. 891 (Fla. 1934).
35. See United States v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 155 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
36. See Sikes v. Dade Lumber Co., 123 So. 918 (Fla. 1929).
37. 22 FLA. Jua. Mortgages § 123 (1958).
38. Id. For a complete listing of the varieties of statutory liens, see ch. 713 FLA. STAT.
(1977).
39. 6 FLA. L.W. at 79. The court stated:
A developer, in carrying out a uniform plan of development for a residential
subdivision, may arrange for the provision of services to the subdivision or for the
maintenance of facilities devoted to common use, and may bind the purchasers of
homes to pay for them. In this case, all of the elements of an affirmative covenant
running with the land have been established. Of course, we are not directly con-
cerned with whether the covenant to make the payments runs with the burdened
land since the party sought to be charged is the actual covenantor.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
40. 86 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1956).
41. Id. at 140.
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Diamond v. Woodlands Homeowner's Association, Inc.42 involved
an action for nonpayment of recreation fees on a different section
in the same Tamarac development. The facts are virtually identical.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the failure to pay
the ground rent for the recreational facility entitled Behring to a lien
on the property. However, the opinion does not indicate whether a
homestead defense was raised. Instead, the decision was based on
the liability of the lot owner to pay the ground rent on a covenant
running with the land. The liability for the ground rent is controlled
by the deed or other instrument of conveyance under which the rent
is reserved or created. 3 Generally, a covenant for the payment of
ground rent is a real covenant that runs with the land and it binds
all heirs and assigns of the covenantor." In Bessemer the declaration
of restrictions expressly provided that the lease for ground rent
would be a covenant running with the land. Since the rent is tied
to such a covenant, the one in possession of the land is responsible
for the payment. Furthermore, the prevailing view is that a lien for
arrears in ground rent relates back to the time when the ground rent
deed was executed." Thus the Gerstens took title to land which was
subject to a real covenant, evidenced by a prior recorded declaration
of restrictions and recreation lease, and a lien in effect as to subse-
quent purchasers."
In response to the real covenant contention, the Gerstens argued
that a lien may stem only from a valid debt and a valid debt must
have a corresponding contractual obligation.47 However, as the
Bessemer court found, a debt was created with the execution of the
lease on April 9, 1970, and the subsequent completion of the facility
gave rise to a definite obligation to pay. The consideration required
to support the lease was the actual construction of the recreation
grounds which, in turn, enhanced the value of the development."
Even an option to create an encumbrance, supported by valid con-
sideration, albeit without an existing debt, would be superior to
subsequent encumbrances." Likewise, in the case of a mortgage to
secure future advances, a lien is created at the time it is executed
42. 348 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
43. Id. See 38 C.J.S. Ground Rents § 11(a) (1943). See also Anderson v. Susquehanna
Power Co., 160 A. 286 (Md. App. 1932).
44. 38 C.J.S. Ground Rents § 11(c)(2)(b) (1943); see Broadwell v. Banks, 134 F. 470
(C.C.S.W.D.Mo. 1905).
45. 38 C.J.S. Ground Rents § 11(e)(1) (1943).
46. 6 FLA. L.W. at 79.
47. Brief of Respondents at 7 (citing Hendrie v. Hendrie, 94 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1938)).
48. 6 FLA. L.W. at 79.
49. See Feemster v. Schurkman, 291 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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or recorded although the debt does not yet exist. 0
At this point the supreme court should have ended its inquiry.
Florida law supports the simple conclusion that the lien attached
to the affirmative covenant for ground rent at the time the obliga-
tion was created, i.e., the recording of the lease and the subsequent
completion of the facility. The Gerstens accepted title with full
knowledge of the maintenance fee and the lien. Thus, a contractual
lien arose prior to the time the Gerstens accepted title and estab-
lished their homestead. To hold otherwise would be to permit the
homestead to become an instrument of fraud.5
The court's opinion, however, is perplexing. First, the court exam-
ined its options. "We could find that the lien attached along with
the covenant prior to conveyance and was therefore a preexisting
encumbrance which the [Gerstens] took the land subject to." 2
Second, and alternatively, the court considered finding the lien and
the homestead right attached simultaneously, in which case the
homestead right would prevail unless a "relation back" mechanism
is used. Finally, it contemplated holding that the lien attached after
the Gerstens took title, in which case the homestead would have
priority unless the "relation back" mechanism is adopted. After
reviewing the alternatives, the court avoided any direct answer. It
considered the Gerstens' argument, alleging that the lien cannot
come into existence prior to the conveyance of title because the
developer was not obligated to make the payments secured by the
lien. The court did not make reference to Diamond v. Woodlands
Homeowner's Association, Inc. 53 or other ground rent cases. It based
its decision, in part, on Mendrop v. Harrell,54 a Mississippi case
which supports the existence of a lien attaching to an affirmative
covenant to pay for paving running with the land. The Mississippi
court held, "The intention of the parties is the test, with resort to
the words of the covenant read in the light of the surroundings of
the parties and the subject of the grant. 5 5 The Mississippi court
used the phrase, "intention of the parties," in referring to the
original parties to the ground rent lease. In Bessemer the parties to
the ground rent lease expressly indicated their intent to affix a lien
50. See generally Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960). The
execution of the mortgage is the effective date for persons with actual notice. The recording
of the mortgage is the effective date for the rest of the world (constructive notice).
51. See generally Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Milton
v. Milton, 58 So. 718 (Fla. 1912).
52. 6 FLA. L.W. at 79.
53. 348 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
54. 103 So. 2d 418 (Miss. 1958).
55. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
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upon nonpayment. Indeed, such intention was filed as a matter of
public record.
The fact that the language in this opinion is demonstrably capa-
ble of misinterpretation immediately becomes evident by .the Ger-
stens' contention in a motion for rehearing that the issue of intent
was never raised in the lower courts, i.e., the intention of Gersten
and Behring rather than the intention of the original lessor and
lessee." The Gerstens also argue that an equitable lien was decreed
and that they never had an opportunity to litigate that claim (the
issues concerned a contractual lien).57 An amicus curiae brief, filed
by the Office of the Attorney General on behalf of the Gerstens, also
questions the court's finding of an equitable lien.58
The confusion lies in the language of the Bessemer decision itself.
The court concluded that a contractual lien was enforceable (the
lien affixing to the real covenant) but it discussed various equitable
doctrines. " '[E]quitable' liens on real property are recognized
upon a showing of intent of the owner to pledge or charge his prop-
erty or upon a decree of a court of equity under considerations of
right and justice."59 The court was apparently straining to empha-
size that "[a] lien is not a 'thing' necessarily having a definite time
of inception and termination, but is a right, of a special nature, to
have a thing stand as security for an obligation.""0 It concluded that
"[w]hen an equitable lien is decreed and held enforceable against
homestead property, the courts are not concerned with the niceties
of when the lien attached."'" Indeed, the court's opinion is replete
with needless equitable overtones. "If the covenant was attached to
the land, as an encumbrance or servitude, when the purchasers took
title, it would seem only reasonable and fair to hold that the enforce-
ment mechanism was attached also. '6 2 It is not only "reasonable
and fair," it is the law in Florida.
If the court decreed an equitable lien, then the Gerstens were
denied due process of law. Furthermore, would not the "equities"
of the situation compel the court to pass on questions of unconscion-
ability and public policy?
The supreme court ruled correctly but its equivocal opinion offers
little guidance to the student and practitioner. Hopefully the opin-
ion on rehearing will clarify the ambiguities and declare the exist-
56. Brief of Respondents on Rehearing at 5.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Amicus Curiae Brief of Attorney General at 2.
59. 6 FLA. L.W. at 79.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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ence of a lien in law. Although recreation leases may yet be over-
turned on alternate grounds, the lien established by recording a
declaration of restrictions and a ground rent lease prior to the estab-
lishment of homestead should not be subordinate to the homestead
exemption, especially where the purchaser is aware that he is buy-
ing into a development with a recreation lease.
JEFFREY H. ABRAMS

